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ABSTRACT
Popular wisdom holds that publishers revise college textbooks mainly to kill off the secondary
market for used books. While this behavior might be profitable if consumers are myopic, uninformed
or have high short-run discount rates (that exceed the publishers'), neoclassical authors have noted
that it will typically not be profitable if publishers can precommit not to cut prices and if consumers
are forward-looking and have similar discount rates as the publishers; the consumer's willingness
to pay for new books falls if they know that they cannot resell their used books. Using a large new
dataset on all textbooks sold in psychology, biology and economics in the 10 semesters from 1997
to 2001, we estimate a demand system for books to test whether textbook consumers are forward-
looking. The data strongly support the view that students are forward-looking with low short-run
discount rates and that they have rational expectations of publishers' revision behavior. When the
students buy their textbooks, they correctly take into account the probability that they will not be able
to resell their books at the end of the semester due to a new edition release. Conditional on faculty
assignment behavior, simulation results suggest that students are sufficiently forward-looking that
publishers could not raise revenues by accelerating current revision cycles.
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  The pricing and design of durable goods has been the focus of an enormous 
literature in economics.  Frequently, however, theoretical results contradict popularly-
held views of durable goods markets.  For example, many basic theories and 
conventional wisdom greatly diverge on the question of whether producers have an 
incentive to eliminate resale markets for their used products.  Conventional wisdom 
suggests that the existence of resale markets is bad for producers and that producers 
have an incentive to kill off resale markets.   For example, in 2002, the Authors Guild, a 
trade group for writers, called upon its members to boycott Amazon.com for launching 
a market in used books.   
However, a basic neoclassical model of durable goods markets suggests that a 
monopoly producer who can pre-commit to future prices should not feel threatened by 
the opening of resale markets.  This is because rational forward-looking consumers will 
fully incorporate expectations about future resale opportunities into their willingness to 
pay for a good today. 1  Rational, forward-looking consumers are also crucial for the 
important literature extending the conventional analysis to models that address time-
consistency issues on the part of the producer. 2   
Recent work in behavioral economics, however, has attacked that view of 
consumers.  Two strands of the behavioral literature are especially relevant.  First, 
behavioral economics has argued that individuals are myopic; they have a difficult time 
evaluating future payoffs relative to current payoffs.3  Second, even when consumers 
fully comprehend future payoffs, a large behavioral literature argues that they tend to 
have extremely high short-run discount rates.4  If consumers are not fully forward-
looking, or if they have exceedingly high short run discount rates, their willingness to 
pay for a good may not respond much to the future resale price of the good.  If 
consumers fail to forecast the future or discount future payments at a much higher rate 
than do producers, producers may find it optimal to charge lower prices for their new 
goods and then undertake actions to kill the resale markets for used goods.5   That is, the 
opportunity for a producer to lower the resale value of the good ex post may be a 
“shrouded attribute” of a good, as in Gabaix and Laibson (2005).  The publishers can 
exploit the ignorance or impatience of the consumers.     
The market for textbooks provides a “textbook case” of the divergence between 
the neoclassical and the popular/behavioral views regarding durable goods.  Publishers 
                                                 
1 Indeed, some authors raised precisely the neoclassical arguments in opposing the Author’s Guild 
Boycott of Amazon.  See Nasar (2002).  This argument is put forward in Friedman (1961), Miller 
(1974) and Swan (1970,1971), among others.      
2 See, for example, Coase (1972), Swan (1980), Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982), Bulow (1986), Gul et. al. 
(1986), Carlton and Gertner (1989), and Waldman (1993).  
3 McClure et. al. (2004), for example, present brain scan evidence illustrating that evaluating the future 
involves is more cognitively costly than evaluating the present.   
4 Frederick et al. (2002) provide an overview of the voluminous behavioral literature on time 
discounting and time preference.   
5 Barro (1972) and Nocke and Pietz (2002), for example, establish such results in durable goods 
models.    3
revise textbooks frequently and when they do, college bookstores almost immediately 
stop selling older editions.  The popular view holds that publishers exploit students by 
introducing these new editions because they are trying simply to eliminate competition 
from inexpensive used books.6  Traditional economic reasoning, as described in 
Friedman (1962), Miller (1974), or Swan (1970,1971) claims that this argument does not 
make sense; forward-looking consumers will pay less for new books if they cannot sell 
them back at the end of the year.7  Indeed, under some basic assumptions about the 
market,  one can show that publisher revenues should be invariant to the expected life of 
a college textbook.  In such a model, revisions must be driven by some other factor such 
as demand for updated content.8    
  In this paper, we use a new dataset of college textbook assignments and college 
textbook purchases (new and used) in the disciplines of economics, psychology, and 
biology to study how forward-looking the buyers of college textbooks are and the 
implications of their behavior for publishers.  Despite its status as a classic example of a 
durable good, the textbook industry has seldom been studied empirically. 9  We start by 
noting the many ways that the textbook market provides an ideal empirical setting to 
examine forward-looking behavior because it lacks many of the complicating factors 
found in other such industries.  Then, we establish three basic results.   
  First, we show that the prices of new and used books remain fairly constant over 
the life of an edition, while the probability that the edition is revised (thus rendering the 
book unable to be resold to the campus bookstore) varies rather dramatically over the 
life of the edition and across fields.  This means that the purchasing behavior of an 
elastic forward-looking consumer (i.e., one that takes into account the ability to resell the 
book at the end of the semester) should change over the life of the edition in a way that 
the behavior of a myopic consumer or a consumer with a high short-run discount rate 
should not.   
  Second, we estimate a demand system and show rather clear evidence  
that consumers in this market are, in fact, forward-looking.  They take into account the 
probability that the publisher will revise a book during the course of the semester when 
deciding whether to buy books at the start of the semester; students are more elastic in 
their new book purchases the higher is the probability that they will not be able to resell 
their books.  The magnitude of student responses is completely consistent with fully 
                                                 
6 The idea that new product modifications might be motivated by an attempt to kill the market for 
used goods, has been discussed extensively, starting at least with Galbraith (1958).  For a recent 
example of this argument, see, for example, Fairchild (2004). 
7 Other durable goods papers that discuss textbooks include Rust (1986), Waldman (1993), 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), and Waldman (2003).   
8 The important assumptions are that books do not change quality when they get revised, that books 
do not fall apart over time, that students do not want to keep their textbooks at the end of the 
course, that the used textbook market has no frictions, and that students are rational and forward-
looking with the same rate of time preference as the textbook publishers. 
9 We have learned of one recent paper that examines textbooks as a durable good (Iizuka, 2004).  
This paper takes student myopia as given and examines the relationship between textbook 
characteristics and textbook revisions.     4
rational expectations of the revision probability and a traditional (i.e., small) short-run 
discount rate.  Consumers care enough about the future resale price of their books that 
we can reject not only myopic behavior but also most conventional forms of hyperbolic 
discounting.     
  Third, although the actual textbook market does not satisfy all the assumptions 
of the stylized model of Miller (1974) (and, implicitly, many other neoclassical models of 
durable goods), simulating the revenue effects of adjusting the revision cycle in our 
demand system suggests that students are sufficiently forward-looking that publisher 
revenues would remain fairly constant and might actually fall if publishers tried to 
accelerate the revision cycle.    
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 explains why textbooks provide an 
ideal environment to test for forward-looking behavior among durable goods customers.  
Section 2 provides a description of the data.   Section 3 examines new prices and new 
edition introductions in the college textbook market and the implications for the true 
price of textbooks.  Section 4 explains the methodology.  Section 5 presents the baseline 
results while Section 6 deals with potential alternative explanations.  Section 7 considers 
the implications for publisher behavior and Section 8 concludes.  
 
I.  Textbooks as a Durable Good: Industry Background and Previous Literature 
A. Textbooks as a Durable Good: Theoretical Advantages 
  There are several theoretical and practical advantages to the textbook industry 
that make it an attractive place to test for forward-looking behavior of consumers.  The 
theoretical advantages arise because textbook markets are exempt from some of the 
durable goods issues that occur in most other durable goods markets.   
  First, because each semester brings a new generation of students to the market to 
buy books and these students, essentially, decide at the beginning of the semester 
whether or not to purchase the assigned textbook for their class, there is little scope for 
delaying purchase of the good until the next semester.  It seems unlikely that students 
would delay taking a class in response to expected changes in the characteristics of the 
textbook.   A significant literature in macroeconomics and industrial organization, 
including, for example, Caballero (1990; 1993), Eberly (1994), Melnikov (2000), and 
Carranza (2004)  focuses on consumers’ transactions costs, S-s considerations, and 
expectations of future price and quality changes in decisions regarding the timing of 
when to purchase or replace a durable product.  These issues are not crucial here for two 
reasons.  As long as a students choose classes in a schedule determined by their 
academic program and then purchase their textbooks only at the beginning of the 
semester in which it is assigned, and only sell them at the end of the semester, we avoid 
these complications entirely. 
  Second, because quality differences between a new copy of a given textbook and 
a used copy of that textbook are readily observable at the time of purchase, adverse 
selection and the ʺlemonsʺ problem of Akerlof (1970) are not especially relevant. 
  Third, when a new edition of a textbook is introduced, the consumer’s decision 
of whether to upgrade to the new edition is fairly simple.  Textbooks are frequently   5
revised and the new edition kills off the old one almost immediately.  In our data from 
college bookstores, we find that, after a single transitional semester, college bookstores 
simply do not sell used older editions of a textbook once the new edition has been 
published.10  Most college bookstores claim this as a policy, arguing that faculty are 
frustrated when students rely upon editions other than the one assigned.11  This, 
combined with the aforementioned fact that each consumer is effectively a potential user 
of a given textbook for only a single semester, implies that we can avoid considering 
consumer decisions of whether to consume the older or newer version of the product.  
Such issues are of key importance in the market for software, for example, and are 
discussed in work such as Levinthal and Purohit (1989), Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) 
and Viard (2004). 
       
B. Textbooks as a durable good: Practical Advantages 
  In addition to the simplified theoretical setting of textbooks as a durable good, 
there are several factors that make textbooks an attractive place to do empirical testing, 
arising mainly from factors that simplify the estimation problem and facilitate data 
collection.   
  The first such practical advantage is that the purchase decision process for 
textbooks is done in two separate stages and our dataset allows us to observe each stage.  
Typically, the instructor decides what book to assign for a course.  Next, the students 
decide whether to buy the assigned book (or a used copy of the assigned book).  
Students are unlikely to buy an alternative book, no matter what its price may be.  Thus, 
while the instructor may have a cross-price elasticity between entirely different 
textbooks, the student typically does not.  In our estimation, we observe textbooks 
assigned and purchases, and thus, can examine student demand conditional on instructor 
assignment.  This restricts the choice set for our estimation to something quite 
tractable.12  It also allows us to ignore oligopoly interactions as an impetus for planned 
obsolescence.  In contrast, for many other durable products, one would ideally need to 
consider the substitution between each possible new product with each available vintage 
of each product’s used goods.  This forces Esteban and Shum (2004), for example, to 
make extensive restrictions on the matrix of substitution possibilities in order to estimate 
demand for new and used cars.13  Copeland and Stevens (2004) face similar issues in 
their study of new and used highway rollers.   
                                                 
10 This situation is beginning to change with the growth of used book sales on the Internet, a topic to 
which we return later.   
11 The website of the National Association of College Stores (www.nacs.org) suggests, in their 
“FAQs on used textbooks” that carrying only current editions is a universal college bookstore policy.   
12 This feature of the textbook industry is analogous to some other industries with natural restrictions 
to the dimension of the choice set.   In pharmaceuticals, for example, physicians may choose across a 
wide range of alternative therapies, but consumers have no choice of which chemical compound to 
purchase once they receive a prescription. 
13 A 2004 Civic, for example, could have a different cross-price elasticity with respect to the 2003 
Civic, the 2002 Civic, the 2001 Civic, and so on, as well as to the 2004 Corolla, the 2003 Corolla, the   6
  The second practical advantage of textbooks is that, despite the recent growth of 
online buying, the majority of new textbook transactions still happen at college 
bookstores.  A survey by the National Association of College Stores estimates that only 
6% of college textbooks were sold online in 2000 (our data will be for the 1997-2001 
period).   Our survey of 203 Yale College students enrolled in Introductory Micro (Econ 
115a) in 2003 showed that, of the 178 students who owned the required course textbook, 
130 had purchased it at the campus bookstore (and among those that had not, friends 
were the most likely source).14   
  A final practical advantage of the textbook market is that textbooks are an 
important category of spending by students so we can expect that they take their 
purchase decisions seriously.  The Book Industry Study Group estimates that, in 2002, 
wholesale sales of college textbooks totaled some $4 billion.  Fairchild (2004) surveys 
students throughout the University of California system and estimates that the typical 
college student spends $898 on textbook purchases each year, a non-negligible fraction 
of the typical student’s annual expenses.15   Indeed, because of the cost of textbooks and 
the transitory nature of demand by the students, it is not surprising that a well-
developed used market exists.  The National Association of College Stores webpage 
estimates that used materials accounted for 28.5% of course material revenues at college 
bookstores in 2003.   
  
II.  Data  
Our data come from the foremost data source in the industry—Monument 
Information Resources (MIR), a consulting company that collects data from college 
bookstores, creates databases and sells them to textbook publishers.  We have access to a 
sample including all textbooks in the fields of economics, biology and psychology.  Our 
sample includes semester level information from 1997 to 2001 (10 consecutive 
semesters).  Over the whole time period, a total of 1698 schools are included in the 
data.16   
The main limitation of our dataset is that it covers college bookstore sales, but 
not sales through other channels.   As discussed above, we are fortunate that Internet 
retailers were negligible during this period.   However, when examining used books, it 
is important to keep in mind that informal sales of used textbooks between students 
                                                                                                                                                 
2002 Corolla, etc.  The difficulties of estimating such a model without extensive restrictions should 
be clear.  
14 One might ask why the campus bookstore remains so important.  One reason is that the bookstore 
allows students to obtain the book quickly.  Another is that bookstores generally allowed books to be 
returned (as new) several weeks after purchase if the student shows proof of dropping the assigning 
course. 
15 A similar study conducted by the staff of Sen. Charles Schumer (2004) estimates the costs of 
textbooks at New York Universities to have been $922 per year in 2003.   
16 The number of college bookstores surveyed by MIR increases over the time period.  MIR 
estimates that their survey represents 31% of college bookstore sales in 1996 and 58% of college 
bookstore sales by 2001.  We will adjust for the shifting sample in each year by scaling sales up by 
MIR's estimate of their market share in each period.   7
may be important and we will use other means to establish that the unmeasured used 
book sales are not confounding our results.  In our survey of microeconomics students 
(in a late year of the edition for the textbook), we found that, while virtually all students 
buying the book new purchased it from the campus bookstore, only about half of the 
students buying used did so.   
We merge together two different datasets from MIR, MIR’s database of textbook 
assignments and MIR’s database of textbook sales.  The database of textbook 
assignments lists, for each course at each university in the sample:  the semester and 
year of the course, the course number at the school, the name of the course, the 
instructorʹs name, MIR’s course category classification, and, crucial for our purposes, the 
number of students estimated to be enrolled in the course when the instructor places his 
or her book order, and the actual enrollment in the course.17  The assignment data 
contain the textbook(s) assigned for each course as well as an indicator that defines 
whether each assigned book is required for the course or optional.  These data give us an 
estimate of how many students were assigned a given textbook in a semester.   
We merge the assignment data with the second MIR database, the sales data.  
The sales data provide, for each semester, the aggregate sales of each textbook across all 
schools.  MIR does not provide us data on sales at the individual school level.  
Importantly, the bookstores surveyed for assignments each semester are the same ones 
in the sales records for that semester.  So, the sum of books assigned can be compared, 
on a consistent basis, to the sum of books sold.  In practice, we cleaned the sales and 
assignment data to fix any obvious coding errors such as enrollments 10 times larger 
than the entire student body of a school, and so on.   
When considering the propensity of students to purchase assigned textbooks, we 
will also consider student characteristics at schools that assign the book.  To estimate 
these characteristics, we use data from the 2000 College Board survey and match them 
by name and location to the MIR data.  For this study, we use information from the 
College Board on the size of each university or college, the mean SAT scores, and the 
fraction of students commuting to the college or university rather than living in 
university housing.18 
  We do need to do two types of interpolation to match up all these data sets 
comprehensively.  First, not every school reports SAT scores to the College Board.  Of 
these, a large fraction (mostly in the Midwest and South) report ACT scores in lieu of 
SAT scores.  We convert ACT scores to SAT score equivalents using the methodology 
described in Dorans (1999).    For some other schools missing SAT scores, we were able 
to find SAT or ACT scores from the 1999 or 2001 College Board surveys or on school 
                                                 
17 MIR’s definition of the topic area of the course represents MIR’s attempt to code all “introductory 
microeconomics” or “intermediate microeconomics” courses with a common course number across 
schools, so that enrollments in a similar course across schools can be matched. 
18 In principle, the College Board data also contain more detailed information about each university, 
such as distribution of students across majors, financial aid, etc.  These data were missing for large 
numbers of schools so we did not use them. 
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web pages.  Of the 1698 unique schools in our dataset, though, 575 still had no data.  For 
all schools, however, the College Board data categorizes the school by selectivity and 2- 
year versus 4-year status.  The schools missing SAT scores were mainly open admission 
2-year community or junior colleges.  For these schools we assigned the mean SAT score 
of other schools in that category.  
The second interpolation relates to the assignment data.  The data provide 
enrollments but the actual enrollments are frequently missing so we use the estimated 
enrollment (which is estimated by the instructor at the time the book is ordered by the 
bookstore).  In cases where even the estimated enrollment figure is missing, we must 
impute it in order to get aggregate assignment figures across all schools that will be 
comparable to the sales data.  We do this imputation using school-level predictors of 
estimated enrollment for each of the 121 unique courses in the three disciplines as 
identified by MIR.  We regress school-level total enrollment in each one (using all the 
schools for which we have the enrollment data) on the university’s total enrollment, 
squared total enrollment, female enrollment, the school’s mean SAT score and its square, 
dummies for the type of institution in the College Board classification system, and 
interactions of those dummies with enrollment, a spring dummy, and year dummies for 
each year of our sample.  We then use the predicted values from these regressions to 
predict course level enrollments for the schools that were missing enrollments.  
For the analyses in this paper, we examine new and used sales for a textbook in a 
given semester compared to the number of students assigned the textbook in that 
semester.19  Throughout our analysis, we remove lab manuals and student study guides 
from consideration, focusing only on textbooks.  We have information for each school-
course whether the book is required or optional and we use it to compute a ʺfraction 
requiredʺ variable.  Occasionally, and with increasing frequency, study guides, 
dictionaries, CD-ROMs or other ancillary material are shrink-wrapped to the textbook 
and sold as a unit.  We identify such bundled units, and assign the assignment and sale 
of such a bundle to the textbook in the bundle.   For all textbook-semesters in the 
dataset, we generate a variable equal to the fraction of sales of the book that are shrink- 
wrapped with something else.20  Again, the time period of our data is fortunate, in that 
the bundling phenomenon appears to have escalated between the end time of our data 
and today.  We also collect data about the format of the textbook:  paperback, hardcover, 
spiral bound, etc.  We do this by searching on Amazon.com by ISBN number.  For this 
analysis, we use these data to form a dummy variable which takes the value one when a 
book is paperback and zero otherwise.   
                                                 
19 We summed across all sales of a textbook based on all available information in the MIR data on 
author, title, etc. (as well as frequent double-checking on the Internet) to match up different versions 
of the same textbook.  This involved tracing a book through edition changes, but also aggregating 
different packages involving the same textbook.  We devoted untold hours to doing this by hand 
ourselves, but certainly some errors in this process may remain. 
20 This bundling presents two practical complications.  First, the “wrapped” textbook and the 
textbook alone do not have the same product code identifier (ISBN number) despite being the same 
book.  We have hand-identified such books as being in the same book.    Second, these bundles have 
a different price from the main textbook.   9
Finally, some popular books get assigned to classes but are not actually textbooks 
(i.e., their primary market is not students).  Because of this limitation, we will sometimes 
examine  separately the sample of books whose new price is $40 or more.  This rules out 
virtually all trade books.  None of our results are much affected by the choice.   
We present summary statistics for the variables in our sample in Table 1.  
 
III.  Implications of Prices and Book Revisions for Forward-Looking Consumers 
  Our goal is to determine the extent to which durable goods consumers behave as 
if they anticipate the resale market for textbooks, and anticipate that new editions will 
render their books unsaleable.   The basic idea is that the true price of a new textbook 
embodies two components.  The first is the purchase price.  The second is the amount 
the book can be resold for at the end of the semester.  Thus, the true price of a new book 
is:  
[] TRUE NEW RESALE PP E P δ = −  
where δ is the studentʹs discount factor.  We will see that in the textbook market, the 
relative importance of those two components change rather dramatically over the life of 
the book, even though the first component, the new price, changes very little.  A myopic 
consumer or a consumer with very high short-run discount rates will be focused on the 
purchase price whereas the forward-looking consumer should be taking into account the 
amount for which they can resell the book at the end of the semester.  Our identification 
will come from the fact that the two terms move quite independently of one another 
over the life of the textbook.   
 
A. Purchase Prices of Textbooks 
  The approach one might at first consider taking in estimating demand in such a 
market would be to examine changes in the relative prices of new and used books over 
the life of the edition.  However, in reality these prices do not change much.     
  First, the new price itself is fairly constant over the life of the edition.  Intuitively, 
one might expect that the used price and new price would vary depending on how long 
the current edition has been available (both because of the declining asset value of the 
book and because of the growing stock of used books available), but this isnʹt true.21  In 
Table 2, we estimate a regression of the form: 
 








m jt t jt k
k






where ln(Pjt) is the natural log of the new price of book j at time t, Spring is a dummy for 
the spring semester, and Avshrink is the share of books shrink-wrapped with something 
else such as CD-ROMs, study guides, etc.  The Ik dummies index the age of the edition 
                                                 
21 It is worth considering whether this behavior reflects the publishers somehow having pre-committed not 
to cut prices/increase production in future periods but this subject is beyond the scope of our empirical 
work here.   10
for a given book.  That is, if a book was released in the first semester of 1998, and then a 
new edition was released in the first semester of 2000, there will be observations for the 
two semesters of 1998 and the two semesters of 1999, and the semester since edition 
change would move from zero to three.  In the first semester of 2000, the time since 
edition change would return to zero.  Since a constant is included in the regressions, in 
the new book regressions, elapsed time of zero periods (i.e., new) is the omitted 
category.  Importantly, we also include book fixed effects denoted by the B variables.   
We can include time controls in two ways.  First, as in column (1), we can simply 
allow a linear time trend to allow prices to drift up or down in average prices of all 
books over time.  Second, as in column (2), we can allow a different dummy for every 
time period (in doing so, we omit Springt as redundant).22   
In both of these cases, we see that the nominal price of a new book is rising 
modestly over the life of the edition.  There is certainly no evidence that prices fall for 
new textbooks, and the increases in prices over time is roughly consistent with the level 
of inflation.  Finally, in column (3) we restrict attention to books costing more than $40 in 
their first year (as a crude mechanism to eliminate trade books).  Here, we find prices 
essentially constant over the life of the edition, suggesting that much of the already 
minimal price increases may be concentrated in the trade books.  These results are all 
robust to alternative specifications of the timing, such as including a continuous variable 
for edition age, or including the probability of book revision.   
  While this pricing behavior is potentially puzzling, the publishers we have 
spoken to claim that it is intentional and based on trying not to anger the professors who 
assign the book.  We have no way to know if this explanation is reasonable so we will 
not attempt to explain their pricing behavior.  Instead, we will take the prices and 
assignment behavior as given and examine whether students buy the book conditional on 
the professor assigning it.  Interestingly, it is worth noting that other information-based 
durable goods have followed similar pricing behaviors (the price of the Windows 
operating system, for example, generally does not change much in the periods prior to a 
new edition of Windows being released).   
  Second, not only is the new book price very stable, but the ratio of the used book 
price to the new book price hardly changes over time either.  We randomly selected one-
tenth of the college bookstores in our sample to survey about their college textbook 
selling policies.  All of our respondents informed us that their bookstore sells all used 
textbooks at a price equal to exactly 75% of their new textbook price.23   We also visited 
the websites of many college bookstores that offer pre-ordering of college textbooks 
                                                 
22 Note that estimation of this vector of time indicator parameters would not be possible if we also 
included the full complement of book age indicator variables.  However, our specification groups 
together books for which more than 8 periods have elapsed since the revision change.  Given the 
indicator variable scheme we have used, it is clear that the time indicator parameters are effectively 
identified in the data by using the price changes from books that have not revised in over 8 periods.  
That is, the time indicators essentially reflect the price paths of seldom-revised books such as the 
Marx-Engels Reader or the Selfish Gene. 
23 For almost all bookstores this new price is just the list price though there are a few, such as the 
Stanford bookstore, where new textbooks are sold at a small discount.     11
online (for in-store pickup) and these stores all priced used books at 75% of the new 
book price.  It is not clear why this should be true.  An interview with executives from a 
chain that operates hundreds of college bookstores in the U.S. indicated that many 
universities that contract out their bookstore operation  require the store to set used 
book prices at a maximum of 75% of the bookstore’s new book prices. 24  In our dataset, a 
basic regression of the used textbook price on the new textbook price yields a coefficient 
of 0.74 with an R-squared of 0.99.  Given this pricing rule, there is no practical way to 
estimate a cross-price elasticity of demand between new and used books.  Further, our 
interview with executives at the large bookstore chain also suggests that college 
bookstores frequently sell out of used textbooks at the 75% price.  In order to cope with 
the institutional features of this market, in the analysis below, we consider mechanisms 
for modeling the rationing of used books.   
  Perhaps not surprisingly, given these first two facts about book prices, the  price 
paid when a used book is resold to the bookstore is also  fairly inflexible.  Our surveys 
and interviews suggest that most large college bookstores will buy back any book that is 
being used on campus in the subsequent semester for 50% of either the current or 
previous new price.  The 50% buyback price, like the 75% selling price, is often set in the 
contract between the University and the bookstore operator.  Generally, most end-of-
semester sellback events also have a table with representatives from one of the three 
major used college textbook wholesalers.  If a book has not been reordered for the 
subsequent semester at that campus, students are referred to the wholesaler for a 
buyback price.25  These wholesalers offer prices that are somewhat more variable than 
the 50% rule, and tend to be somewhat lower than 50%.  At the beginning of each 
semester, the textbook retailer sources used textbooks out of its own buybacks and from 
wholesalers.  The large textbook retailer that we spoke to suggested that used book 
wholesalers generally charge the bookstores a wholesale price that induces rationing 
books relative to the orders placed by retailers.  As mentioned before, the textbook 
retailers generally sell the used books at 75% of the new book price, often creating used 
book stock-outs at the retail level.26  Almost no one in the college bookstore supply chain 
                                                 
24 This interview was conducted in August of 2004 but the company prefers to remain confidential.  
25 Many of the smaller college bookstores have a buyback in which the bookstore is not involved at 
all.  Students simply sell their books to one of the textbook wholesalers. 
26 Given the fixed pricing regime, one might ask whether the marginal profitability of an additional 
new book and an additional used book are equal.  The National Association of College Stores 
(NACS 2004) reports that gross margins on used books are approximately 34.4% and gross margins 
on new books are approximately 22.9%.  The 34% figure almost exactly matches what one would 
expect when buying a book at 50% of the new price and selling it at 75% of the new price.  Since 
used books are sold for 75% of the new book price, this implies that gross dollar margins are slightly 
higher for used books.  However, handling costs for used books are slightly higher, leading true 
dollar margins to be close to equated.  An industry source pointed out to us that most retail leases 
involve payments as a function of gross revenues (i.e., not profit) so under the current pricing 
regime, the rationing by the wholesaler may constrain the retailer, as retailers offering the “standard” 
pricing policies and a revenue-based lease would, at the margin, prefer to sell more used books than 
new ones.      12
is willing to buy or sell a used book for an outdated edition beyond one transitional 
semester. 
  In the case in which the student resells the book to the bookstore, the sell-back 
price of the book is 0.5 times the new book price.  Given the fact that reselling through 
informal channels is fairly prevalent, in our estimation, we will consider the possibility 
that the expected sell-back price could be as high as 0.75 times the new book price.  This 
would occur if a student sells the book directly to another student at the bookstore’s 
retail price.  Separately estimating the demand effect of current prices and expected 
future resale prices may seem impossible in this case since the price of new textbooks 
varies little over the life of the edition and the sellback price is constant.  However, one 
thing does vary greatly over the life of an edition: the probability that the edition will be 
made obsolete by a revision.  If that happens, the buyback price for students holding the 
obsolete book essentially falls to zero.27  
Given the fixed relative prices and the steadily rising supply of available used 
books, the ratio of used book sales to book assignments rises over the life of the book 
while the ratio of new book sales to assignments falls over the life of the book.  
Generally, by at most 3 to 4 semesters into the edition life, used books sales exceed new 
sales.  Importantly, too, in every period there is a sizable fraction of students assigned 
the book that do not buy the book at all from the bookstore (typically in excess of 20%).  
This is true even in the first period when used books are not available.  We like to think 
of this choice as deriving from students reading the book at the library, although the 
publishers we spoke with believe that many of the students that do not buy a book 
never look at the book at all.  Regardless, we will treat the decision not to buy the book 
as the outside good in our demand system.  
 
B. The Expected Resale Value of Textbooks and the Probability of Revision   
    If students are forward looking, they should consider whether or not they are 
likely to be able to resell their textbooks.  The expected resale price of book j in time t 
should be (1 Pr(Re )) jt jt vision P µ −  where µ is the fraction of the purchase price at which 
they can sell back the book.28  
  To illustrate the likelihood of revision given the age of the edition, we first focus 
on textbooks in our dataset designed for introductory courses (we will show later that 
introductory and advanced books have different demand and new edition introduction 
characteristics). Figure 1 shows the CDF of new edition introduction for biology, 
economics, and psychology introductory textbooks with a new price of over $40 in our 
dataset.  The database includes only books for which the book was a required book for 
at least 70% of its assignments and excludes lab manuals and student study guides.  The 
CDF is calculated using a Kaplan-Meier survival function accounting for the right-
                                                 
27 Technically, one can now sell used older editions online (though they sell at a rather extreme 
discount), and we will present results allowing there to be a small positive resale value even in the 
event of revision. 
28 This assumes they get nothing for their books if the book is revised.  The results below will 
indicate this assumption is not critical to the results.   13
censoring and left-censoring in our dataset.  Figure 1 shows that, in all three disciplines, 
the majority of textbooks have introduced a new edition in the third year.  This accords 
well with casual empiricism, which suggests that publishers usually sign contracts with 
authors that call for revisions every 3-years.  By the fifth year, essentially all introductory 
economics textbooks have introduced a new edition.29 
  The survival data show interesting patterns in the characteristics of textbook new 
edition introduction behavior.  Table 3 reports a Cox proportional hazard model on the 
book survival data.    The form of the hazard is assumed to be: 
 
] ) ( ) ( ) exp[( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 0 φ φ φ BIOj Econ Intro t h t h j j + + =          (2) 
 
Where  ) ( 0 t h is the baseline hazard.  The explanatory variables included in equation (2) 
are INTROj – an indicator variable that takes the value one for introductory textbooks, 
ECONj – an indicator variable that takes the value of one for economics textbooks, and 
BIOj – an indicator variable that takes the value of one for biology books.  The results are 
shown in Column 1 of Table 3.   
These results show that introductory books have a shorter survival time than 
non-introductory books.  The results also confirm what we saw for introductory books 
in Figure 1; economics books have a shorter and biology books a longer lifespan than the 
omitted category, psychology textbooks.    Later, we will confirm that demand 
characteristics in economics and biology are such that it is optimal from a revenue 
perspective for biology to have a slower revision cycle than economics. 
Column (2) in Table 3 adds an additional indicator variable to the specification, 
EXPENSIVEj, that takes the value of one for books greater than $40.  We do not include 
this variable in the main specification due to obvious endogeneity problems.  However, 
the results for pricing are particularly strong and interesting.  Certainly, we do not mean 
to imply causality in either direction, as the new introduction behavior and pricing 
strategy are clearly jointly chosen.   The data are consistent with a setting in which, if 
publishers expect students to keep the book, they choose a low price and a long life-
span.  If publishers expect students to sell back books to the used book markets, they 
charge a high price and a short life-span.   
It is possible that more elite universities prefer more up-to-date content.  To 
investigate this, in Column 3, we augment our specification in Column 2 to include the 
mean SAT scores of students at the institutions assigning a given book.  If anything, 
though, books assigned at higher SAT score schools have slightly slower revision times, 
although the effect is not statistically different from zero. 
                                                 
29 Iizuka (2004) addresses the issue of textbook durability using MIR data on sales of economics 
textbooks, hypothesizing publishers either want to update the content or else to kill off the used 
book market.  Given the spike in the death of textbook editions at right around three years (the per 
semester hazard in that single semester is almost 20%), and given the standard three-year contract 
offered by most major publishing houses, ex post variation in the amount of used textbook sales 
across books does not seem to be the primary determinant of new edition introductions.   14
  Given the changing hazard for a book throughout its revision life, it is clear that 
the ratio of the current price to the expected future resale price will differ across book 
types and will change rather dramatically over the life of an edition.  It is this time-series 
variation in the price that we will use to identify whether and how accurately consumers 
consider the probability of new editions in making textbook purchasing decisions.   
 
 
IV.  Demand for Textbooks: Model and Estimation 
A. Modeling Consumer Utility and Demand 
An important feature of our data is that we separately observe book assignments 
and student purchases.  From that, we can estimate demand for book j conditional on the 
instructor assigning the book.  Thus, while the instructor chooses a textbook to assign 
given the characteristics and possibly prices of a range of potentially appropriate 
textbooks, the student faces no cross-book decision.  The student simply decides 
whether or not to buy the assigned book (and whether to buy it new or used, a decision 
we return to later).  Consider a student i, whose utility  ijt u  from purchasing an assigned 
textbook j at time t is given by: 
 
ijt jt jt jt jt ij p E p x u ε ξ δ α β + + − − = + ]) [ ( 1              ( 3 )  
 
where is the jt p  is the sale price of a new book j, E[ 1 + jt p ] is the expected sell-back price 
for the book, jt x  are observed characteristics of book j,  jt ξ are unobserved characteristics 
of book j (which may be correlated with the prices).30  Individual and book specific taste 
shocks are given by  ijt ε , which is assumed to be i.i.d extreme value.   
For the expected sell-back price term, we have a hazard estimate of the 
probability that the book will be revised in the coming semester and the student will not 
be able to sell back the book (from our hazard estimates above).  Call DIEjt the 
probability that the book cannot be sold back because it gets revised. The expected 
future sell-back price (conditional on not being revised) is a known fraction,µ , of the 
purchase price (with µ  likely to be between .5 and .75) and δ  is the student’s discount 
factor.  Then the student’s utility can be written: 
 




ijt jt jt jt jt jt ijt p ) DIE 1 ( p x u ε ξ αδµ α β + + − + − =      (5) 
                                                 
30 Our formulation assumes no risk aversion on the part of the consumers.  We believe this to be 
reasonable both because the risk on any given book is a very small gamble relative to overall student 
income and because students are not known for their excessively risk averse natures.   15
 
Student i will purchase book j if purchasing book j provides higher utility than 
not purchasing the book (and hopefully going to the library to do the assigned reading).  
We normalize the utility of the outside good to be zero.   
We first consider a simple logit demand framework.  (That is, we assume that 
ijt ε  has an extreme value distribution).  Then, following the standard inversion for 
aggregate data (see Berry 1994), this provides the following equation determining the 
share, sj, of students who buy the book and the share, s0, of students who consume the 
outside good: 
 
0 ln( ) ln( ) (1 ) jt t jt jt jt jt jt ss xp D I E p β αα δ µ ξ −= − +− + .    (6) 
 
Of course, while this demand equation can be easily estimated, we cannot 
separately identify δ fromµ  since they are multiplicative.  However, we have seen that 
µ  is fairly well established in the 0.5 to 0.75 range so we can compute an implied 
discount factor from the ratio of the coefficients.  
We define λ,  the absolute value of the ratio of the two price coefficients in 
equation (6).  In this setting λ =δµ .  Using the estimates of λ , we can test between 
several views of student behavior.  Obviously, a totally myopic consumer should have a 
λ of zero since the revision probability is purely a forward-looking matter.  This would 
also be true of a student who is completely uninformed about the probabilities of 
revision, even if they were not myopic.   
In contrast, a traditional, forward-looking consumer with an annual exponential 
discount rate of, say, 5%, and completely rational expectations regarding the revision 
hazard, should generate a λ equal to µ times the one semester discount factor (i.e., 
between 0.5 and 0.75 times approximately 0.975).  This implies a λ of at least 0.49 and at 
most 0.73.   
  Finally, a person with an extremely high short-run discount rate would discount 
be expected to have low values of λ.  .  The empirical and calibration work in behavioral 
economics on myopia, hyperbolic discounting, or other studies of time discounting have 
argued that short-run consumer discount rates may be in the 40-65% range (see Laibson 
(1997), Laibson et al (2004), Fang and Silverman (2002), Paserman (2002) or many of the 
papers cited in Frederick et al., 2002).  It is useful to consider what bounds this puts on 
our estimates.  At the low end, a non-myopic individual with an extremely high annual 
discount rate of 65% would have a λ of 0.3 if the typical book resale price were 50% of 
the new price.  If instead, short-run discount rates were on the low end of the range 
estimated in the behavioral literature (0.40) and if the typical book resale price were 75% 
of the new price, we would observe a λ of 0.58.  Thus, if λ’s are observed that are 
significantly in excess of 0.58, we will infer that discount rates are normative rather than 
behavioral.  
In the regressions, we will include the following book characteristics xjt:  Econj 
and BIOj, indicator variables for the book discipline; INTROj, an indicator for an   16
introductory book; AVSHRINKjt, the fraction of assignments of the book that are shrink 
wrapped with other things, editions bundled with study guides or other material.  To 
proxy for the difficulty level of the book, we include SATjt, the average composite SAT 
score of students assigned book j in semester t.  We also include the fraction of 
assignments of the book that are required,  FRACREQjt.  All books in the included 
sample have a FRACREQjt greater than 0.90, but the actual level of FRACREQjt is still 
included as a control.  We include a dummy variable SPRINGt, which equals one in the 
spring semester and a dummy variable that equals one for paperback books.31  Finally, 
while the age of an edition may enter utility through the probability that a book can be 
sold back, it may also enter utility directly.  Thus, we include EDAGEjt, the age of the 
current edition of book j at time t.  We will also try adding time dummies to account for 
aggregate shocks to the demand for books. 
 
B. Problems in Estimation 
Three issues remain before (6) can be estimated:  rationing, measuring student 
expectations of the revision hazard, and the endogeneity of price.  
  Since consumers can choose between new and used textbooks as well as between 
the outside good, the setup would seem to call for a multinomial choice set.  
Unfortunately, in the presence of rationing (as claimed to us by the bookstore operators) 
that standard model will fail when trying to explain the observed used book market 
share.   We will deal with rationing in two ways.  First, note that rationing used books 
can be thought of as sometimes removing used books from the choice set.  One familiar 
feature/limitation of the logit demand model in (6) is the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives property of the logit.  If used books are (sometimes) removed from the 
choice set, logit  substitution patterns imply that equation (6) for new books is still 
correctly specified.  The share sjt is calculated as students buying the new book divided 
by all students assigned the book.  The share s0t is calculated as students buying neither 
the new or used book divided by all students assigned the book. 
Alternatively, we can relax the assumption of logit substitution patterns between 
new and used books, but impose alternative restrictions.  As in the specification above, 
we assume that preferences over characteristics (theβ ’s) and demand elasticities (α) are 
the same for all students.  Assume also that prices are set such that the used book is 
always rationed, and rationed efficiently (albeit a heroic assumption).  Efficient rationing 
in this circumstance means that the students with the biggest logit error draws are the 
ones that purchase the books.  In this circumstance, then, we can view the buyers of the 
used book as strictly inframarginal.32  Under these circumstances, the share of students 
                                                 
31 We also considered specifications that included measures of the “size” of the book, such as length 
times width times height or number of pages.  These variables did not appear to be important in 
demand specifications.  They were not available for all books, and thus limited our sample size, so we 
chose not to include them.   
32 Note that this assumption is implicit in other treatments of new and used goods.  See, for example, 
Suslow (1986).  While this type of rationing is traditionally called “efficient rationing”, it is actually 
inefficient in this case, in that the highest-valuation students get the low-priced (used) books.   17
buying the book (new plus used) is set at the margin by a new book buyer and thus, by 
the new book price.  Equation (6) above can be estimated, but the share sj is calculated as 
(total new sales + total used sales)/total assignments. 
  For the problem of specifying the students’ expectation of the revision hazard, 
we will specify DIEjt  as we specified DIEjt above—the empirical probability that book j 
will not survive from t to t+1 given its age, field and introductory/advanced status, as 
mapped in Section 3.    We will check the robustness of this assumption by using the 
specific book’s actual hazard (i.e., whether the book is actually revised in the quarter) 
instrumented by the field-determined hazard or by a vector of book age dummies.  The 
results using these robustness checks are virtually identical so we are not too concerned 
about the impact of biased student hazard forecasts.   
Finally, we must address the traditional problem of the endogeneity of price (and 
thus also the interaction of price with the probability of revision).  Absent rationing, we 
could solve this problem by jointly estimating supply and demand.  Given the 
complications posed by rationing, however, we will settle for estimating demand alone 
using instruments for the current and expected future price terms.  We include several 
instruments.  First, we include a dummy that equals one if a book is published by a non-
profit publisher.  Our data suggest that non-profit publishers (such as most University 
presses) charge systematically lower prices.  We include the share of non-profit 
publishers among textbooks designed for the same course as the textbook in question in 
the year in which the textbook was published.   We also include the Herfindahl index for 
publishers for the course in the year in which the textbook was published.  Because we 
are instrumenting for price and the price-die probability interaction, we include the die 
probability as an instrument and also include as instruments, interactions between the 
other instruments and the die probability.  Finally, we include interactions between the 
basic instruments and the years since revision (elapsed time).    
 
V. Basic Results 
We start, in Table 4  Column 1, by simply estimating an OLS version of Equation 
(6) to describe the data, neglecting the endogeneity of price for the moment.  The raw 
data certainly suggest forward-looking consumers with low discount rates.  The 
coefficient on future prices is large and significant and the estimate of λ, the ratio of the 
two coefficients (in absolute value) listed at the bottom of the table is quite large, 0.89. 
  Our main baseline specification is the GMM estimation of Equation 6 including 
the full instrument set.    We present these results in Column 2.33   Accounting for the 
endogeneity, the results still clearly reject the hypothesis that consumers are myopic in 
that there is a significant coefficient on the future price term suggesting that demand 
becomes more sensitive to price the smaller is the probability that the book will be 
revised in the coming semester.  The magnitude is large.  In a period in which the book 
will certainly not be revised (i.e., the survival rate is 100 percent so the price coefficient is 
the sum of the current and future price components), the elasticity of demand for a book 
                                                 
33 Our sample includes all books.  We restricted the sample to only books with prices greater than 
$40 and found almost identical results.   18
with the mean price is -0.9.  For a book that is certain to be revised, though, the survival 
rate is zero so the future price term disappears.  The elasticity of demand for students 
facing imminent revision is more than four times higher at -3.7.   
The estimated value of λ at the bottom of the table is 0.77 and the standard error 
is relatively small.  The model rejects myopic consumers (λ of zero).  The estimates also 
fall outside the range suggested by the behavioral literature on excessive short run 
discount rates.  We argued that the literature’s 40%-65% annual discount rates suggest 
values of λ  in the range of 0.3 to 0.58.  All values of λ in this range are rejected in the 
data.  The data do not reject the benchmark neoclassical value of 0.65 (nor, of course, any 
of the other reasonable parameter values up to the neoclassical maximum of 0.73).  
The other coefficients mostly accord with intuition.  The probability of purchase 
is significantly higher for books assigned to high-SAT students and for books that are 
assigned as “required” more frequently.  There appears to be a somewhat lower 
propensity for students to purchase paperback books (of course, holding price constant).  
The share of students buying the book conditional on assignment does not vary 
dramatically for introductory books (versus intermediate and advanced courses), nor 
across fields.  
In Columns 3 and 4, we examine the robustness of our specifications.  We limit 
the sample to the subsample of books priced at greater than $40 in Column 3, and in 
Column 4 we include time dummies.  In both cases, we can clearly reject the myopic 
benchmark λ of 0.  Our estimated λ in the >$40 subsample is 0.52, inside the confidence 
range for both the behavioral and the neoclassical benchmarks.  For the time dummy 
specification in Column 4, λ is 0.76, implying short run discount rates that are much 
lower than those found in the behavioral literature.   
In the next two columns, we include book dummies and explicitly look at the 
same book across time.  The problem here is that the price results above suggested that 
the prices of a given book do not change much over the life of the edition so this is likely 
to generate noise in the price series.  That said, the interaction of price with the survival 
probability would still be identified even if the price remained completely constant 
because the probability of revision is changing over time.  In Column 5 we add the book 
dummies and leave out the own price on these grounds.  Doing this we can only test 
whether consumers are myopic.  We cannot identify λ.  Furthermore, there are some 
books that are observed with limited frequency in the data; we limit our analysis to the 
8875 books that appear in at least 4 semesters in the data.   These data overwhelming 
support the view that students are forward-looking as the future price term remains 
large and significant.   
In Column 6, we add the current price term separately, albeit with the 
understanding that the small price variation within a book over time will not be well-
identified by the publisher characteristics that we have included as instruments.  
Interestingly, the coefficients are not significantly different from the baseline case.  There 
is still significant evidence in favor of forward-looking consumers.  The estimate of λ in 
this case, however, is about 0.72, consistent with neoclassical consumers.  However,  as 
one might expect, the standard error around our λ estimate is large.   19
Finally, in Column 7, we present the “efficient rationing” version of our baseline 
specification.   Not surprisingly, the elasticities implied by the price coefficients are 
notably smaller in this specification34 but there is still significant evidence of forward- 
looking behavior.  The implied price elasticity of demand rises from close to zero for a 
book certain to have no revision to –0.41 for a book certain to be revised.  The implied 
estimates of λ, however, again suggest that students are not myopic and have normative 
discount rates.    The point estimate is larger here than in column 2 and, though we 
cannot reject standard neoclassical consumers, the point estimates would suggest that, if 
anything, the students are too concerned with the future and are too sensitive to the 
probability that their books will be revised throughout the semester (as opposed to the 
popular view that students donʹt understand that revisions will leave them holding 
unsellable books). 
  
VI. Robustness and Alternative Explanations 
A. Measuring the Expected Resale Value 
  We can directly translate λ into a discount rate under two assumptions:  (1) that 
when the book is revised, students cannot resell it and so receive nothing and (2) that 
students correctly estimate the probability of revision (calculating the 1-DIEjt term).   In 
Table 5, we investigate our specifications in light of each of these assumptions.    First, in 
Column 1, we allow for a book to continue to have a value even if it gets revised that 
semester.  To put a magnitude on this value we searched Amazon and Bookbyte.com for 
examples of textbooks for which used books of previous editions and used books for the 
current edition were both being sold.  The first thing we noticed is that even now, with 
the Internet providing a national market for such obsolete used books in a way that 
simply did not exist at the time of our sample, there are very few used books available 
for previous editions (consistent with our view that there is little demand for such 
books).  That said, we looked for a few widely available texts and found some out of 
date copies for sale.  On average, these books sold for about 20-30% of the lowest prices 
of the current edition used book.35 We will take 20% for simplicity but the choice does 
not matter.  
In Column 1 of Table V, then, we allow the expected resale price to equal (1- 
DIEjt) µPjt + DIEjt (.2)µP =(1-.8*DIEjt) µP rather than the traditional (1-DIEjt).  Allowing for 
the additional value of the obsolete books makes virtually no difference to the results.  
There is still a strong and significant coefficient on future prices, ruling out myopia.  The 
implied λ is also still large enough to reject hyperbolic discounting and fully consistent 
with standard neoclassical assumptions.  The implied λ is almost 0.8. 
  The other part of the expectations of the resale price comes from the estimation of 
                                                 
34 Note that the efficient rationing specification treats all used book buyers as inframarginal, implying 
that the availability of low-priced used books do not expand overall demand at all.   If the underlying 
assumptions are not true, this specification would bias the results toward finding very inelastic 
demand.   
35 The books were Carlton and Perloff's Industrial Organization, 3rd and 4th editions, Perloff's 
Microeconomics, 2nd and 3rd editions, and Kalat's Introduction to Psychology.   20
the hazard rate.  Our treatment assumes students have rational expectations and 
determine the hazard according to our hazard model above.  In Column 2, we take a less 
parametric approach to the issue.  Our basic point is that in periods when a book is 
likely to get revised, students should be more price sensitive.  Even if students do not 
properly estimate the hazard, they might have a general sense that hazards are low early 
in the life of the edition (in our data, per semester hazards are zero for the first year and 
rise to a max of 0.06 by the start of the second year), higher a bit later in the life of the 
edition (per semester hazards are about 0.1 or greater 2 to 3 years into the edition life, 
peaking at 0.18 at 2.5 years) and then, should a book live past 3 years, the per-semester 
hazard is very low (past three years, the maximum per semester hazard is about .06 and 
falls fairly quickly as the book ages).  Thus, we can take a less parametric approach by 
examining price sensitivities for books in each of the three age groups.  We break the 
price term into three parts corresponding with the hazard groups.  The results show 
exactly the predicted pattern.  Price sensitivity almost doubles when the book enters the 
period of likely revision and then falls as the revision probability falls. 
  In Column 3, we examine the actual hazard for the specific book.  We replace the 
DIE variable with a 0, 1 variable.  The variable takes the value one in the last semester 
before a revised edition of the book appears in our data. 36  Since this may be a function 
of demand, we instrument this with our estimated aggregate hazard rate for the book.  
In Column 4, we do the same but instrument the hazard with the edition age groupings 
of Column 2.  In both cases the results reject myopia and the estimates of λ are consistent 
with low discount rates and with the upper end of the neoclassical range.     
 
B. Changing nature of the outside good 
One possible response to our results is to question whether competition from the 
stock of used books generates changes in the price-sensitivity of new book consumers in 
our data over the life of the book.  In other words, one might be concerned that the 
nature of the outside good could change over the life of an edition—in the early periods 
in the life of the book, the outside good is going to the library; in the later periods, it is 
borrowing or buying a used book off of a friend’s shelf.  A change in the utility of the 
outside good over the life of the good could lead to estimated changes in the price 
sensitivity of new book buyers over the life of the book.  To the extent that the changing 
utility of the outside good could be correlated with our revision hazards, omitting 
measures of the stock of used goods in the model could lead to a spurious conclusion 
that students are responding to the changing revision probabilities.   
We note that the evidence that we have already seen suggests that this 
alternative explanation is unlikely.  While the stock of used books in the informal 
channel is presumably continuously rising over the life of the edition, the hazard rate of 
new edition introductions is decidedly non-monotonic.  As described above, it is zero in 
our data early in the life of the book, rises to a peak at 3 years and then falls sharply.  We 
saw in Column 2 of Table 5 that the price sensitivity follows this same non-monotonic 
                                                 
36 We drop data from the last year of our sample, since we cannot tell whether a new edition comes 
out the following semester.   21
path.  Nonetheless, in Table 6 we examine the sensitivity of our results to measures of 
time series changes in the quality of the outside good by proposing various measures of  
the competition from used books in the informal sector.   
In practice, we do this two different ways.  First, we assume the used book stock 
is rising smoothly over the life of the book and interact price with an edition age time 
trend.  We include this as a regressor in the base specification to allow a “horse race” 
between the Price x (1 – DIEPROB) interaction and a Price x (edition age) interaction.  
We present this result in Column 1 of Table 6.  The results show that this extra variable 
has little explanatory power (the t-statistic is 0.45) and has no impact on the rejection of 
myopic consumers and that our estimate of λ of 0.77, still rejects the behavioral 
discounting but not the neoclassical. 
Second, we look more specifically at each book individually and construct the 
number of total assignments of book i prior to the current semester divided by the total 
assignments of book i in the current semester as a measure of the probability that used 
books are available for students to peruse.37  We interact this measure with price to see if 
books with a larger stock of used books can explain our results.  The point estimate 
suggests that students are slightly more elastic as the relative stock of used books to 
current assignments rises.  However, the coefficient on the future price term is still large, 




  The final alternative explanation we consider is that there is heterogeneity across 
types of books and/or types of consumers that might create a spurious relationship 
between revision probability and price sensitivity.  We take two approaches to 
examining this.  First, we include in our specifications simple interactions between 
student/book characteristics and Price and student/book characteristics and P x (1-
DIEPROB) to uncover potential differences in price sensitivity or sensitivity to resale 
prices.  Second, we undertake a structural model of heterogeneity (similar to Berry, 
Carnall, and Spiller (1997) and Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2003) to allow for the 
possibility of two consumer types, one that sells back books and one type that never 
plans to sell back books.   
Books can differ on many dimensions in our dataset.  First, we consider the 
possibility that they might be geared to richer or higher-SAT students.  If either the 
students in these groups have heterogeneous preferences, or the books geared to them 
are heterogeneous, we might see important differences in the elasticity of demand with 
respect to either current or future price across books geared to different student types. 
To examine this possibility, in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6,  we interact both the book 
price and P x (1-DIEPROB) with measures of student income (namely percent of student 
                                                 
37 This measure has a minimum of zero and looks reasonable over all but, for a small number of 
books, exceeds 100.  Because the entire market could be served by used books whether this ratio is 
10 or 1000 (and because it might be the result of measurement error), we top code the data at 10 for 
observations where it exceeds that value.    22
at schools assigning the book that are commuters38) or student quality (namely average 
SAT score).  
The College Board data provide an estimate of the fraction of students at each 
school in our college bookstore sample who are commuters.    We compute the weighted 
fraction of commuters at the schools assigning each textbook (with the number of 
assignees as the weights) minus the overall mean fraction of commuters for all assigned 
textbooks in the data (in order to give the variable a mean of zero).  We interact this with 
price and include it as a regressor. 
The results, in Column 3, suggest that demand is statistically significantly  more 
elastic for books assigned to commuters versus non-commuters.    However, there is no 
significant difference between the commuters and non-commuters in sensitivity to the 
future price term.  The estimated λ for books assigned to the mean level of commuters is 
is 0.72.  For a book with assignments 1 standard deviation above the mean level of 
commuters, our estimate of λ drops only slightly to 0.70. 
In Column 4, we do the same exercise but using the mean SAT score of schools 
assigning the textbook (weighted by the number of assignees) minus the overall sample 
mean SAT score of assignee schools in the dataset.  We reestimate the basic logit 
specification including SAT interaction effects and there is no significant difference 
across SAT scores in either of the price coefficients.   The estimated λ for a book with 
mean SAT score assignments remains close to our original estimates at 0.69.  For a book 
with assignments 1 standard deviation above the mean SAT level in our database (64 
SAT points above the mean), our estimate of λ climbs to 0.77.  Thus, our estimates are in 
the direction of suggesting that books assigned to commuters and books assigned to 
lower SAT students are evaluated more myopically than books with the mean student 
characteristics.  However, the standard errors around these estimates are sufficiently 
large that we cannot reject that the λ values are the same. 
One obvious potential heterogeneity would seem to arise from the fact that some 
fraction of students want to keep their books at the end of the semester rather than sell 
them back to the bookstore.  The first thing to note, though, is that consumers who plan 
to keep their books should look very much like myopic consumers.  Their utility 
function will ignore the probability of being able to resell the book.  The existence of 
such “book-keepers” in our data would tend to bias our results in favor of finding 
myopia.  Nonetheless, we investigate this in two ways.   
First, we attempt some interaction terms that might separate book-keepers and 
resellers.  The share of people wanting to keep their books might be expected to vary by 
whether the books were introductory or advanced books.  In Column 1 of Table 7, we re-
estimate the model for books but with separate price and expected future price 
coefficients for introductory and advanced books.   Interestingly, we find that students 
are more price sensitive (both today and in the future) for advanced books.  We can only 
                                                 
38 We contemplated other measures, but the commuting ratio is reported by the College Board for 
almost all schools.  Various measures of financial aid are more sparsely reported.  Alternatively, high 
tuition might proxy for family income but may also mean students have less discretionary income 
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speculate on why this may be—perhaps introductory courses rely more on the textbook 
and less on outside readings than advanced courses.  These values allow us to calculate 
separate values of λ for introductory and advanced books.  We find large point 
estimates of λ for both introductory and advanced books, far outside the boundaries 
dictated by hyperbolic demanders and even large relative to the neoclassical benchmark.  
However, given the smaller number of introductory books in our sample, the standard 
errors for our estimate of λ  for introductory books is quite large.  While the estimated λ 
for introductory books is larger than for advanced books (which would correspond with 
the intuition that intro books are more likely to be resold), the difference between the 
estimated λs for the two groups are not statistically significant.   
  Similar to the intro/advanced distinction, book retailers have suggested to us 
that, as a rule of thumb, they believe that students are more likely to keep their biology 
textbooks and sell back their social science textbooks, because their biology textbooks 
are useful in studying for standardized tests when applying to medical school.  In 
Column 2 we repeat the standard estimation of Table 4,  but allow the coefficients to 
vary by field.  The results do indeed indicate that biology books λ is smaller than the 
estimated λs for psychology book, and significantly smaller than the estimated λ for 
economics textbooks.  The estimated λ of 0.58 for biology books is two standard 
deviations below the estimated λ of 0.89 for economics books.  One could conceivably 
attribute these differences to differences in the forward-lookingness of the students 
taking courses in the three fields.  However, in this case, even if all students are reselling 
their books, in all three cases, the point estimate of λ for biology sits just at the boundary 
of the plausible range for behavioral discounters, with the point estimates for economics 
and psychology falling above the maximum values consistent with hyperbolic 
discounting.   
  None of the specifications thus far fully address the issue of possible unmodeled  
consumer heterogeneity in a structural way.  It is possible that there are some consumers 
who simply have a high utility from keeping textbooks, and some students who always 
plan to resell.  We allow for this possibility by estimating a mixture model of 
heterogeneity that allows for two distinct consumer types, following the methodology in 
Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2003).   
Suppose that a fraction τ of consumers have utility as specified in Equation (5) 
above.  We call these consumers “sellers”.  A fraction 1-τ have utility:  
ijt jt jt jt ijt p x u ε ξ α β + + − =     (7) 
That is, they do not consider the expected future resale price of the book, because they 
do not plan to resell it.   We call these consumers the book-keepers.   We impose on our 
model the assumption that these consumers are identical to our standard consumers in 
other ways, except for this.  That is, we impose that the other parameters of their utility 
functions are identical to that of the consumers described by Equation (5).  The share of 
assigned students buying book i, si, is the weighted average of the market share of the 
book among the book-keepers and the sellers, where the weights are just the fraction of 
each type in the population (1-τ and τ).     24
Estimation in this scenario poses two complications.  Most importantly, because 
the current specification of the market shares is non-logit, the IIA property does not 
hold.  This forces us to model the choice between new and used books and use our data 
on prices in the used book market.   We model the utility of purchasing a used book, for 
both consumer types as: 
ijt jt jt
used
jt ijt p F u ε ξ φ γ + + − =      (8) 
where Fjt is a vector of characteristics of the used book and pjtused is the price of the used 
book.  For the used book characteristics, Fjt, we use the only the discipline dummies 
interacted with edition age, to proxy for the probability that older used books are 
differentially attractive in different disciplines. 
  The second complication that this scenario poses is that the parameter values 
cannot be obtained analytically as in the homogeneous logit formulation.  Thus, we 
follow the methodology of Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2003), who undertake a modified 
version of the contraction-mapping in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).  Details of the 
procedure can be obtained in their paper.     
Estimating the model as described above, the estimated share of book-keepers 
was zero.  This suggests that the mixture model does not fit the data any better than our 
baseline model.  Thus, we undertook a second approach, imposing a mixture share on 
the data using plausible values for the share of students that do not want to sell back 
their books.  Actual estimates of the share that want to keep their books are difficult to 
obtain.  In our data, sales of used books in an edition’s second full semester (so there is 
only one previous semester’s worth of used books available) are about 48% of the 
previous semesterʹs sales.39  Given that many of used books are also sold informally, this 
provides a lower bound on the share.  We asked an executive at a leading textbook 
publisher what fraction of students resell their books, and he estimated this fraction to 
be 75% or more, depending on the field.40  We posit 67% as a reasonable figure. 
In Columns 3a and 3b we present estimates of the mixture model, forcing the  
share of book-keepers to be 0.33 and the share of book-sellers to be 0.67.  We constrain 
the “book-keepers” and the “sellers” to have the same demand parameters in every 
respect except in their valuation of future resale.  Because this specification includes 
book fixed effects, we limit the sample to those books with greater than 4 observations in 
the data.  These estimates also require us to have data on the prices and quantities of 
used books, slightly shrinking the sample.  The estimated λ in this specification, 0.70 is 
almost exactly the same as we obtained before. 
 
VII.  Implications for Publisher Behavior 
Our results, then, show that students are definitely forward-looking when they 
buy their textbooks and that their behavior is consistent with very low discount rates.  
                                                 
39 We excluded lab manuals and any books whose fraction required was less than 90% in order to be 
sure we had traditional textbooks for this computation. 
40 Estimated by Craig Bleyer of Bedford, Freeman and Worth, in e-mail correspondence on January 
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An important question is whether the consumer behavior that we have estimated is 
coherent with current publisher revision policies.  Using our demand estimates plus 
some additional assumptions, we can provide a simulation of the revenue/sales 
implications of a regime change in which publishers adopt longer or shorter revision 
cycles. 
Our ability to measure the profit implications of changing the revision hazard is 
limited by three factors.  First, we have not estimated how faculty assignment behavior 
is affected by the age of an edition.  Teachers may prefer newer material, for example, 
irrespective of the economic considerations.  For the purposes of our calculations below, 
however, we will assume that edition age has no impact on faculty assignment behavior, 
leaving that issue for examination somewhere else.  Second, we have not estimated the 
costs of producing a new edition.  We will discuss how these issues affect our 
interpretations of our results below.  Third, our estimates are generated entirely by the 
demand system.   We are ignoring, for example, the possibility that time-inconsistency 
on the part of producers could alter producer behavior.41   
Remember that in the canonical forward-looking neoclassical model of Miller 
(1974), the rationality of the students implies that the publisherʹs revenue does not vary 
with the length of the revision cycle.  To illustrate the reasoning, take an example where 
the students’ willingness to pay for a semesters’ worth of use of a textbook is $10 and 
their discount rate is r.  If new books were issued every semester (making reselling of 
old books impossible), publishers could sell new textbooks for $10 each period.  If 
instead, books were never revised and could be resold forever, new textbooks could be 
sold for a price of $10/r.  The present discounted value of revenues will be $10/r either 
way.  This is quite different than in a purely myopic model where the publisher stands 
to gain a great deal by accelerating the revision cycle (or, similarly, in a model where 
publishers have low discount rates and students have hyperbolically high short-run 
discount rates). 
In this section, we consider representative examples.  We saw above that biology 
textbooks have overall relatively slow revision cycle than economics textbooks.   
Consider a hardback introductory economics textbook and a hardback introductory 
biology textbook that is assigned to 7000 students per semester, every semester for 8 
semesters.  We estimated the new edition hazard for textbooks with those 
characteristics.    Using the demand estimates from above, we can simulate the effect of a 
faster revision cycle and a slower one.   
For each of the two types of textbook, we take the current semester by semester 
hazard as given, and examine the revenue implications of two regime shifts.  We  
simulate the effects of moving the textbooks onto a 1 semester slower or a 1 semester 
faster revision cycle.  Since both categories of books have two semesters at the beginning 
where no new revisions are observed in the data, we do this by subtracting or adding by 
                                                 
41 We are somewhat doubtful that time inconsistency on the producer side plays a big role in 
this industry.  It appears that publishers pre-commit to contracts with authors (usually for 
three years), and appear in our data to be successful at keeping the price of a given book 
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one the number of no revision semesters at the beginning of the book’s lifespan.  After 
the added or subtracted semester, we follow along the actual revision hazard, moved by 
one semester.    This can be seen in Table 8.  There, we show, for each semester N, the 
probability that a book that was “born” in Semester 0 will have an edition age that is N 
in the Nth semester.  So, for example, biology books in our data are never revised in 
Semester 0 or Semester 1, have a 4% chance of being revised in Semester 2, and a 8% 
chance of being revised in Semester 3.  The table reports that the probability that the 
edition is N semesters old is 1 in the 0th semester, 1 in the 1st semester, 0.96 in the 2nd 
semester, and 0.84 in the 3rd semester.  When we simulate a faster hazard, then the 
probability that the edition is N semesters old is 1 in the 0th semester, 0.96 in the 1st 
semester, and 0.84 in the 2nd.  When we simulate a slower hazard, then the probability 
that the edition is N semesters old is 1 in the 0th, 1st, and 2nd semesters, and 0.96 in the 3rd.   
A shift in the revision hazard has three effects.42  First, if new editions are 
introduced more frequently, then the sales of used books drop to zero more frequently.  
On the other side, if students are forward-looking and understand the change in the 
revision hazard, the change in the sell-back probability will affect their demand for the 
new book.  Third, if the age of the edition directly impacts students’ propensity to buy 
the assigned book (as in the demand results above), then the frequency of new editions 
will directly impact sales of the new book.      
For this calculation, we examine compare required hardcover introductory 
economics textbooks and required hardcover introductory biology textbooks.  All other 
book characteristics are held at their means for intro biology textbooks and intro 
economics textbooks (the variable “spring” is set equal to ½).  Coincidentally, the mean 
price of both hardcover introductory economics books and hardcover introductory 
biology books is $78.  Using these characteristics, we separately estimate demand for 
introductory biology books and introductory economics books using the specification in 
Equation (5).  From the demand specification, we generate predicted values 
of ) ln( ) ln( 0t jt s s −  for the introductory required books for each possible edition age.   
As mentioned above, we take the case of a book that is assigned to 7000 students 
each semester.  Because used book prices are largely set administratively and used 
books are allocated by queuing, we estimate the share of used books using a simple 
regression specification.   We estimate ρ  and θ in the specifications:  
jt jt jt
used ETIME s ε ρ + = ) (     (9) 
 
where sused is the number of used copies of book j sold divided by the number of 
students assigned book j in time t, ETIMEjt is the number of semesters since this edition 
book j was released and the Ik’s are book fixed effects.  Because the fields potentially 
differ in the desire of students to keep the books, we estimate (9) separately for 
                                                 
42 We model the revision cycle as a hazard function rather than a specific, pre-determined time 
mainly because that is how we estimated things above but also because any publisher will tell you 
that, although one can demand that a faculty author produce a book by a specific date, the actual 
arrival time is uncertain.   27
economics and biology textbooks.  Our estimate of ρ  for economics textbooks is 1.6 
times our estimate of ρ  for biology textbooks (we obtain essentially the same results if 
we include book dummies in the specification).  As expected, used book sales build up 
more slowly in biology than in economics.  Using our estimates of ρ  for biology 
textbooks and economics textbooks and our example of a book that is assigned to 7000 
students each semester, we can then generate a predicted number of used book sales for 
each book age.   
Given our estimates of the used book sales for each discipline, the total number 
of students assigned the book, and  ) ln( ) ln( 0t jt s s − , we can back out the predicted new 
book sales for each semester.  That is, for our example, we generated predicted new and 
used book sales for a new introductory economics textbook book, a 1-semester old 
edition, etc.   
In order to calculate revenue effects, we consider a hypothetical economics 
hardcover book and a hypothetical biology hardcover book that start out in the new 
(zero-semester-old) state.  Each book ages but may return to the zero-semester old state 
at any age.  The probability of returning to the zero-semester old state varies with the 
edition age following the hazard functions described above.  These hazard functions 
fully describe transition matrices.  For any age of a book N, the book will either 
transition to age N+1 or will transition to age 0.  We use the transition matrices under 
each of the hazard assumptions to derive the probabilities that a book is in a given 
edition age state after n semesters.  By multiplying the probabilities that a book is in 
each state by the predicted level of new book sales for that state, we generate an 
expected number of sales for each semester that elapses since a book is first introduced.   
Table 8 shows these results. The upper panel compares sales of a biology 
textbook following the actual biology revision hazard to sales of a biology textbook sped 
up or slowed down by one semester.   The lower panel compares sales of an economics 
textbook following the actual economics revision hazard to sales of an economics 
textbook sped up or slowed down by one semester.   Each row represents a number of 
semesters over which we are measuring expected book sales.   For each semester, it 
shows the probability that the book has not been revised at least once (that is, the 
probability that the age of the edition equals than the number of semesters since the 
book was issued).  The expected number of new books sold reflects a probability-
weighted average of all of the states that a book could be in after that number of 
semesters.    For example, if, after 3 semesters, a book has a probability 0.95 being 3 
semesters old, and a probability 0.05 of having been revised and being 0 semesters old, 
the expected sales reported is 0.95 x the expected sales of a 3-semester-old book plus 0.05 
x the expected sales of a 0-semester old book.   
The sum of new books sold after 8 semesters is shown at the bottom of each 
panel of Table 8, as well as an estimate of the present discounted value of revenues at 
the end of 8 semesters.  Present discounted values are estimated assuming a discount 
rate of 3% per semester.     28
It has been argued that the sluggishness of authors is the only thing that prevents 
publishers from exploiting myopic students by issuing new revisions every period.  
However, the simulation in Table 8 suggests that this simply isn’t true.  First, we find 
that, for the simulated changes in expected revision times, expected revenues are 
relatively flat, consistent with the predictions of the canonical neoclassical model.   The 
strongest version of the neoclassical model suggests that revenues (conditional on 
assignment) are invariant to the revision frequency, as long as the revision frequency is 
known.  Despite the fact that there are some inefficiencies in the used book market (in 
particular, used books are generally not resold at the new book price), the revenue 
simulations come stunningly close to predicting revenues that are invariant to 
reasonably small changes in the hazard rate.   
We were to draw conclusions from the differences that we do see across hazards 
in revenues, we would have to conclude that our results suggest that publishers could 
not increase their revenues by speeding up revision cycles.  Our results suggest that 
publishers of both economics and biology introductory textbooks would lose revenues 
by speeding up their revision cycles.   That is, speeding up appears to be a losing 
proposition even without considering revision costs.  Remember that the optimal 
revision time balances the falling new book sales over the edition life against the 
effective increase in elasticity that results from student’s rationally predicting that they 
may not be able to sell back their books.  It appears that, were economics or biology to 
move to a faster revision hazard, the gains from killing used books would be 
outweighed by the negative effect on student elasticities.   
Indeed, our estimates suggest that biology books would actually improve 
revenues by slowing down their revision schedules.   This stems largely from the fact 
that our estimates suggest that used books build up more quickly in economics than in 
biology.  It is conceivable that publishers are under-appreciating the extent to which 
students are forward-looking and are revising biology books too quickly (especially 
since revision costs are not even taken into account here).  However, we think it is more 
likely this result derives from the fact that we are ignoring any sensitivity of assignments 
to edition age. If biology instructors are very sensitive to edition age, the optimal 
revision policy could be faster than the one we estimate.   
 
VI.   Conclusions 
  This paper has examined the behavior of durable goods consumers in the college 
textbook market to test whether they behave in a manner consistent with neoclassical 
theory.  The results strongly support the neoclassical view of forward looking 
consumers with rational expectations and low short-run discount rates.  The results 
indicate that, at least for this group, consumers think about the future when making 
durable goods purchases today.  The probability that a book will be revised in the 
coming semester (and thus prevent the student from reselling it at the end of the 
semester) has a large and significant impact on the price sensitivity of their purchases at 
the beginning of the semester.  The results are not consistent with consumer myopia or 
ignorance.   Consumers appear to discount the future, in this context, at low rates and to   29
have completely rational expectations regarding publisher behavior.  This denies 
publishers the ability to exploit student ignorance in the way claimed by the popular 
and behavioral economic views. 
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FIGURE 1:    Figure two shows the cumulative probability of a new edition over the life of the edition.  
Time measures the age of the edition in years (where a semester represents a half year).  The sample is 
limited to introductory textbooks in economics, psychology, and biology that cost greater than $40 (on 
average over the life of the book). 
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Table 1 
      Mean  St. Dev. 
Price 11464 57.69 24.13
ECON 11464 0.28 0.45
BIO 11464 0.20 0.40
INTRO 11464 0.25 0.43
AVSHRINK 11464 0.47 40.64
SPRING 11464 0.52 0.50
AVSAT 11464 1052.42 59.12
FRACREQ 11464 0.92 0.16
         
EDAGE 11464 2.60 3.26
PAPERBACK 11464 0.48 0.50
Fraction assignees         
  buying book new  11464 0.30 0.18
Fraction assignees         
  buying book overall  11464 0.50 0.18
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Table 2 
Independent variables  (1) (2) (3)
Elapsed time – 1  0.014 0.014 0.009
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Elapsed time – 2  0.029 0.030 0.017
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Elapsed time – 3  0.045 0.045 0.025
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Elapsed time – 4  0.058 0.058 0.031
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Elapsed time – 5  0.071 0.072 0.035
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Elapsed time – 6  0.080 0.080 0.040
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Elapsed time – 7  0.088 0.089 0.037
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Elapsed time – 8  0.099 0.100 0.044
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Elapsed time > 8  0.104 0.104 0.035
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
SPRING -0.0067     -0.0052
   (0.0015)    (0.0017)
SHRINK %  0.042 0.042 0.038
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
TIME_ID 0.041     0.057
   (0.001)    (0.003)
Constant 3.72 3.95 3.97
   (0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
Book fixed effects?  Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects?  No Yes No
Sample All All >$40
N 11464 11464 8690
R-squared 0.989 0.989 0.935
Table 2:  The dependent variable is ln(new price).  Standard errors are in parentheses.   33
Table 3 
   (1) (2)  (3)
 Independent Variables  Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio  Hazard Ratio
INTROj 1.562 1.524  1.350
   (0.131) (0.128)  (0.143)
  5.33 5.02 2.84
ECONj 1.345 1.312  1.371
   (0.125) (0.122)  (0.154)
  3.19 2.92 2.81
BIOj 0.886 0.873  0.819
   (0.083) (0.081)  (0.087)
             -1.30  -1.46  -1.89
EXPENSIVEj     1.596  1.507
      (0.169)  (0.186)
  4.42 3.32
MEAN SATj    0.999
   (0.001)
   -1.46
Number of obs  7107 7107  5830
Number of subjects  2160 2160  1819
Number of failures  748 748  592
Log Likelihood  -4659 -4648  -3571
Table 3:  Cox hazard estimates of time to new edition as a function of book characteristics.   
Standard errors in parentheses.  Z-statistics in italics.   34

















      
Price  -0.053 -0.064 -0.074 -0.062 -0.045 -0.005
    (0.023) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.0188) (0.003)
P x (1-
DIEPROB)  0.047 0.049 0.039 0.047 0.041 0.032 0.009
    (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.0074) (0.003)
ECON  -0.080 -0.048  0.035 -0.057  -0.258
    (0.023) (0.062) (0.010) (0.059)  (0.049)
BIO  -0.192 -0.038  0.054 -0.039  -0.162
    (0.028) (0.081) (0.110) (0.079)  (0.049)
INTRO  -0.119 -0.084 -0.046 -0.091  -0.069
    (0.025) (0.069) (0.086) (0.069)  (0.039)
AVSHRINK  0.001 0.001  0.0007 0.0008 0.360 0.498 0.001
   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
    
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.119) (0.125) 
    
(0.0000) 
SPRING  -0.079 -0.076 -0.110 -0.081 -0.023 -0.051 -0.197
    (0.019) (0.047) (0.051) (0.045) (0.038) (0.042) (0.028)
AVSAT  0.001  0.0008 0.001 0.0006 0.003 0.003 0.000
    (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)  (0.000)
FRACREQ  1.491 1.728 1.459 1.743 0.431 0.469 1.669
    (0.066) (0.224) (0.222) (0.211) (0.127) (0.122) (0.140)
EDAGE  -0.043 -0.051 -0.081 -0.052 -0.343 -0.150  0.005
    (0.003) (0.008)  (0.0128) (0.008) (0.017) (0.077) (0.005)
PAPERBACK  -0.041 -0.328 -0.609 -0.324   0.186
    (0.026) (0.151) (0.188) (0.141)  (0.109)
Constant -2.42  -1.61  -0.216  
    (0.199) (0.417) (0.729)  







  (0.013) (0.075) (0.083) (0.070) (0.427) (0.956)


















Dummies?  No No No Time Book Book No
N 11464  11464  8690 11464 8875 8875 11464
Table 4:  Logit demand specifications.  Column 1 is estimated using OLS.  Columns 2-7 estimated 
using GMM.  In Columns 1-6 the dependent variable is ln(new books sold) – ln(no. buying no 
book).  In Column 7, the dependent variable is ln(new+used books sold) – ln(no. buying no book).   35
Table 5:  Robustness to alternative specifications of E(Price). 
Independent variables 
 





Price -0.059 -0.048 -0.042
   (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Px(1-0.8*DIEPROB) 0.047  
   (0.005)  
Price x (No revision)  0.038 0.036
   (0.003) (0.003)
P x (Age<2) -0.013
   (0.005)
P x (2<Age<3) -0.022
   (0.005)
P x (Age>3)  -0.015










Model Logit Logit Logit
 
Logit






N 11464 11464 9297 9297
Table 5:  Logit demand specifications.  The dependent variable is ln(new books sold) – ln(no. buying 
no book); all specifications are estimated using GMM.  All explanatory variables from Table 4 are 
included, but coefficients only from the variables of interest are reported. 
   36
 
Table 6:  Robustness to alternative explanations/ continuous book heterogeneity measures 
Independent variables 
 




   
Price -0.069 -.055 -0.066 -0.067 
   (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Price x    
    (Edition Age)  0.0008  
   (0.002)  
    (Past asg/Current asg)  -0.0004  
   (0.0001)  
    (SAT – mean SAT)  0.00004 
  (0.00005) 
   (Commuter – mean Com)  -0.0005  
 (0.0003)  
P x (1-DIEPROB)  0.053 0.043 0.047 0.046 
   (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
P x (1-DIEPROB) x    
    (SAT – mean SAT)  0.00005 
  (0.00006) 
    (Commuter – mean Com)  0.0003  
 (0.0003)  








Model Logit Logit Logit
 
Logit 
N 11464 11464 11464 11464 
Table 6:  Logit demand specifications.  The dependent variable is ln(new books sold) – ln(no. buying 
no book); all specifications are estimated using GMM.  Also included in the specifications are the 
same set of explanatory variables as in Table 4, although coefficients are omitted above for space.   37
TABLE 7: Discrete type models 
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Table 7:  Columns 1 and 2 present logit demand specifications.  The dependent variable 
is ln(new books sold) – ln(no. buying no book) and are estimated using GMM. Standard 
errors are clustered at the course level.  Columns 3a and 3b give the results from a 
mixture model with two types of consumers as described in the text.  All specifications 
include the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 4, although coefficients are 
omitted above for space.   38
Table 8:  Simulated revenues from altering revision hazards 
Biology Book Estimates           
   Slower Hazard  Actual Hazard  Faster Hazard   
      Predicted     Predicted      Predicted 
Semester ProbAge=N  Books  ProbAge=N Books ProbAge=N Books 
0 1.00 2257 1.00 2257 1.00 2118
1 1.00 2141 1.00 1889 0.96 1717
2 1.00 1901 0.96 1446 0.84 1203
3 0.96 1538 0.84 1605 0.77 1019
4 0.84 1095 0.77 1263 0.63 1788
5 0.77  989 0.63 1624 0.58 1672
6 0.63 1782 0.58 1600 0.55 1480
7 0.58 1771 0.55 1421 0.50 1360
SUM     13474   13105   12357
PDV 
revenues     $958,886    $931,425    $875,766
         
Economics Book Estimates      
   Slower Hazard  Actual Hazard  Faster Hazard 
      Predicted     Predicted     Predicted 
Semester ProbAge=N  Books  ProbAge=N Books ProbAge=N Books 
0 1.00 2563 1.00 2563 1.00 2503
1 1.00 2279 1.00 2224 0.98 2108
2 1.00 1964 0.98 1865 0.90 1710
3 0.98 1641 0.90 1527 0.73 1550
4 0.90 1358 0.73 1444 0.47 2023
5 0.73 1343 0.47 1955 0.43 1825
6 0.47 1878 0.43 1794 0.41 1610
7 0.43 1742 0.41 1587 0.39 1460
SUM     14769    14959    14788
PDV 
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